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NO. 11 MARCH 2019 Introduction 
India’s New Israel Policy 
How the Decline of the Palestinian Issue and Economic Reorientation 
Accelerate Indo-Israeli Cooperation 
P. R. Kumaraswamy 
In January 2019, about two weeks before India’s Republic Day, Israel’s National Security 
Advisor, Meir Ben-Shabbat, flew to New Delhi and met Prime Minister (PM) Narendra 
Modi. While such consultations have been routine for the past two decades, the Israeli 
official chose the direct Air India flight from Tel Aviv – a new flight connection that 
could only be established due to an unprecedented permit for Israel-bound flights to 
fly over Saudi airspace. The small incident highlights the distance that India and Israel 
have traveled since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1992. Today, the two 
states share an ever-growing cooperation, especially in the areas of security and eco-
nomic development. This rapprochement with Israel is embedded in India’s broader 
Middle East strategy, in which especially the Gulf Arab states are important partners. 
Thus, India-Israel relations have also been catalyzed by the improvement in ties be-
tween Israel and the Gulf States as well as the diminishing role played by the Palestin-
ian issue. This, in turn, has led India, especially under Modi, not only to strengthen its 
ties with Israel, but also to de-hyphenate those ties from the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict, leading to a marginalization of the Palestinian question in Indian foreign policy. 
 
The rapprochement between Israel and 
India in recent years has been brought 
about at the expense of the Palestinians’ 
standing in India’s regional policy. This 
marginalization could be seen in India’s 
abstentions at the UNHCR votes on the 
Gaza conflict in 2014 and the challenges 
to Jewish historical links to Jerusalem at 
UNESCO in 2016. It was even more clearly 
visible when PM Modi avoided making any 
reference in 2017 to East Jerusalem being 
the capital of the future Palestinian state – 
with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas 
standing by his side. 
In delinking the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict from its relations with Israel, India 
had concluded a shift that began in the 
early 1990s. Prior to that, India had been 
a staunch supporter of the Palestinian posi-
tion, in line with its anti-colonialist stance. 
This policy had been responsible for India’s 
lack of diplomatic relations with Israel for 
more than four decades – despite recogni-
tion in 1950 – and began with India voting 
against the 1947 partition plan for Palestine 
in the UN General Assembly. Only after the 
end of the Cold War did India display a wil-
lingness to come to terms with the new 
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non-ideological international order and 
subsequently normalize its relations with 
Israel. However, it pursued a delicate bal-
ance vis-à-vis the parties to the conflict 
until the latter part of the 1990s, even tem-
porarily endorsing East Jerusalem as the 
capital of a future Palestinian state. 
It was only in the 2000s – during the 
rule of the center-left Congress Party 
(2004–2014) – that India delinked its bi-
lateral ties with Israel from the peace pro-
cess. Even though the coalition demands 
of the Left parties precluded highly visible 
political contacts, relations with Israel were 
primarily driven by India’s defense and 
agricultural requirements. 
In the following decade, especially after 
Modi became prime minister in May 2014, 
another trend emerged, whereby the nor-
malization of Indo-Israeli relations became 
integral to India’s extensive engagements 
in the broader Middle East. India’s approach 
to Israel during this period was no longer 
dominated by the Palestinian issue but by 
economic cooperation. Thus, Israel has be-
come an important partner for India, with-
out these relations being harmed by the 
conflict. This also mirrors India’s changing 
national interests due to its great power 
aspirations, as New Delhi is seeking to shed 
the “developing country” tag. At the same 
time, rapprochement between India and 
Israel was only possible because the impor-
tance of the Palestinian question has also 
been steadily losing urgency for other impor-
tant partners of India, especially in the Gulf. 
India’s Changing Interests 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) coun-
tries are of considerable importance to 
India for political as well as economic 
reasons. A total of 42 percent of India’s oil 
imports come from the GCC, and more than 
7.6 million Indians are gainfully employed 
there. India also has the second-largest Mus-
lim population after Indonesia. The pace 
of Indo-Israeli engagement could not have 
been improved without the Palestinians 
being marginalized in the regional dis-
course, as this would have upset the Gulf 
States. Hence, criticisms of Israel and its 
policies are no longer prominent in joint 
statements, and India and its Arab inter-
locutors now refer to the two-state solution 
and the need for Israeli-Palestinian coexist-
ence. Under Modi, the Palestinian issue has 
only been raised in statements during his 
meetings with leaders of Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt, but not with other leaders in the 
Middle East. 
Thus, the declining influence of the Pal-
estinian factor in regional politics strongly 
facilitated rapprochement with Israel. And 
although the marginalization of the Pales-
tinian cause is not necessarily true for 
the Arab street, Arab governments are ex-
pressing ever-more interest in cooperation 
with Israel and have gradually come to 
terms with Israel’s political legitimacy – 
most well-known is Muhammed bin Sal-
man’s de facto recognition of Israel’s right 
to exist. Other Gulf States have also shown 
openness toward Israel: For example, at 
the Warsaw conference in February 2019, 
several Gulf foreign ministers were seen as 
being on friendly terms with PM Benjamin 
Netanyahu. The shared enmity of the Gulf 
Arab States and Israel vis-à-vis Iran has 
proven to be a catalyst in improving their 
relations. 
These developments have coincided with 
India’s economic ascendance: India is the 
third-largest importer of oil after the United 
States and China, and in 2017, it overtook 
France and became the sixth-largest global 
economy. Along with these developments, 
India has shifted its diplomatic focus from 
associations that concentrate on developing 
countries to the G20 and BRICS nations. It 
is also giving preference to relations with 
economically successful states, reversing its 
previous anti-colonialist stance. Israel fits in 
here well, since it offers economic and tech-
nological prospects. This strategy nurtured 
the de-hyphenating of the Palestinian issue 
with India’s ties to Israel, and New Delhi 
ceased to view Israel as a special case in the 
Middle East. 
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Areas of Cooperation 
India’s relations with Israel operate along 
two major planks: military-security co-
operation and economic issues, although 
the role of decentralization in the promo-
tion of bilateral relations is also instrumen-
tal. Since the 1990s, India has been import-
ing weapons systems from Israel and has 
benefited from the latter’s expertise in up-
grading Soviet military equipment. While 
Israel has become India’s number three de-
fense supplier after Russia and the United 
States, India has become the largest market 
for Israeli military exports. Since 2013 it 
has been the biggest buyer of Israeli equip-
ment, purchasing 49 percent of Israeli mili-
tary exports in this period. In 2017 alone, 
India imported equipment worth $715 mil-
lion, including items such as the Harop 
drone, the Phalcon AWACS aircraft, and 
the Barak 8 LR-SAM air and missile defense 
systems. 
Secondly, both countries have been 
focusing on the civilian agenda to cement 
their ties. Israeli expertise in agriculture, 
water management, dairy farming, waste 
management, etc., has been pushing the 
pace along: Bilateral trade in 2001 was only 
valued at $785 million, but it grew by 600 
percent to $5 billion in 2015. Value-adding 
methods such as technology transfers and 
trainings are shoring-up bilateral relations 
through a specialized and diversified trade 
approach. Agriculture-related investments 
in India are aimed at training farmers in 
modern cultivation skills in 26 Centers of 
Excellence all over India. In 2017 the Indo-
Israeli Agricultural Project was one of Isra-
el’s largest overseas commitments serviced 
through MASHAV – Israel’s Agency for 
International Development Cooperation. 
Hence, agriculture and training programs 
are becoming a game changer for mutual 
relations, especially since the agricultural 
sector in India generates around 15 percent 
of national GDP and employs 58 percent 
of India’s population. One example of the 
impact of Israeli technology on agriculture 
is the introduction of protected environ-
ment cultivation, where water use and 
fertilizer costs are reduced by 90 percent, 
and harvest yields increase by a factor of 
at least 4 to 5. In addition, a $40 million 
technology fund (the Israel India Innova-
tion Initiative Fund) was set up to increase 
research cooperation and address India’s 
food security challenges. 
This economic cooperation was addition-
ally facilitated by India’s federal structure. 
While the Union Government in New Delhi 
is preoccupied with high politics, such as 
the question of Palestinian statehood, the 
state governments are primarily concerned 
with their agenda to further economic 
growth and diversification. Hence, the 
latter – ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP), Congress, and other regional parties 
– have looked to Israel for apolitical and 
non-controversial cooperation on economic 
issues. Even the communist parties, which 
have ideological differences with Israel, were 
not averse to economic partnership with 
and investments from Israel. This process 
has enabled many political parties to criti-
cize Israel at the national level while seek-
ing robust bilateral economic cooperation 
at the provincial level. One can speak thus 
of the decentralization of bilateral relations 
with regional cooperation as a catalyst. 
Limitations of Cooperation 
In the context of the Middle East, India 
has so far been successful in building up its 
level of cooperation with Israel without en-
dangering its relations with others. Never-
theless, limits to the cooperation are visible, 
especially in the field of security coopera-
tion, as this remains a somewhat sensitive 
issue for some Arab states. Contrary to the 
pre-visit media hype in both countries, no 
military deals were signed during Modi’s 
visits to Israel in 2017 nor Netanyahu’s to 
India the following January. Both leaders 
instead focused on civilian issues. Thus, 
although security cooperation remains 
important, a stronger securitization of the 
ties would draw unnecessary attention and 
criticism, both within India and the Middle 
East. Hence, softer issues are emphasized. 
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Hence, despite his perceived fondness of 
Israel, PM Modi has been cautious. Contrary 
to initial expectations within the country, 
his Israel visit took place more than three 
years after he assumed office and after 
visits to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, and Qatar. This shows the 
importance of the Gulf for India, not least 
since the trading volumes between those 
states surpass those with Israel by far: Trade 
with the Gulf Cooperation Council was 
about $104 billion in 2017/8; trade with Is-
rael never exceeded $5 billion. Thus, Israel-
India relations are subject – at least to a 
certain extent – to changes in the status 
of Israeli-Arab relations. 
In addition, ties with Israel are an area 
of potential disagreement between India 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This often 
manifests in Iranian leaders’ flagging of the 
issue in Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state 
claimed by both India and Pakistan. How-
ever, India and Iran have managed to side-
step their disagreement over Israel and seek 
closer ties. That becomes evident, for exam-
ple, in India, which is investing massively 
to develop the Chabahar port in southeast 
Iran. In addition, India negotiated a waiver 
on US sanctions against Iran and continues 
to import Iranian oil. Mutual interests have 
so far prevented Israel from seriously ob-
structing their relations. Although India 
cannot ignore Iran’s importance in the 
region, the Islamic Republic has been too 
preoccupied with greater challenges from 
the United States to worry about Indo-
Israeli relations. 
Conclusions and Perspectives 
The growing marginalization of the Pales-
tinian issue has immensely benefited Indo-
Israeli relations. The decreased focus on the 
conflict has enabled India to expand its ties, 
allowing New Delhi to pursue its broader 
interests in the region without worrying 
about its growing ties with Israel. In addi-
tion to the de-securitizing of relations with 
Israel, India’s overall approach has been to 
focus on economic cooperation, which is 
less controversial. 
Also domestically, there is a greater con-
sensus regarding Israel. If the center-left 
Congress Party, which governed much of 
post-independence India, normalized ties 
with Israel, the Hindu nationalist BJP con-
solidated them through high-profile visits 
and political contacts. The decentralization 
of relations even resulted in regional parties 
contributing to the growth of economic-
related contacts. One could notice a subtle 
shift in Israel’s diplomatic strategy in mov-
ing away from New Delhi to state capitals. 
Thus, even though Indo-Israeli relations 
are interest-driven and mutually beneficial, 
no strategic alliance is being formed. The 
growth of relations with India has been ac-
companied by India seeking closer ties with 
Arab-Islamic countries in the region, in-
cluding Iran, which is hostile to Israel. The 
upward trajectory of the bilateral relations 
with Israel runs parallel to the diminishing 
regional relevance of the Palestinian issue. 
Although the re-emergence of the Palestine 
question to the center stage could affect 
this balance and might even slow down the 
process, the chance of India reverting to its 
pre-1992 hostility toward Israel is unlikely. 
Mutual interests run deeper than mere super-
ficial, short-term cooperation. The interest-
based development of bilateral ties – espe-
cially between Israel and the Indian prov-
inces – is likely to prevail and result in 
future cooperation, even if the Palestinian 
issue regains prominence. 
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